“Toyota Hybrid” technology, with ethanol, is custom made for the 21st century’s move from fossil fuels to renewable energy. Also, it comes without the massive disruption that will be caused by transitioning to fully-electric vehicles.
Toyota Hybrid Synology Drive
Oil-based fuels can be almost completely eliminated via ethanol. Brazil has shown the way to get started by being able to use higher ethanol mixes. The aim should be to get to 100% Ethanol (E100).
Fully-electric vs Ethanol
Almost all the infrastructure is in place to move to ethanol as the primary fuel for all vehicles, whereas fully-electric vehicles will require a virtual doubling of the demand for electricity. In addition, fast electric charging stations would need to be built right across every nation, including nations with large open spaces like Australia, most of Africa, north and south America, and in Asia.
The demand for electricity from this approach will require a much larger electricity-generating sector. This will be difficult for countries that are already electricity poor, especially in the absence of relatively cheap coal-fired generators.
The demand for finite resources in order to build fully-electric cars will create supply difficulties, with the world possibly coming close to exhausting such resources. The supply of cobalt is already under stress and alternatives are being developed. The future supply of copper and lithium could also be a limiting factor.
Fully-electric cars at present are much more expensive that vehicles running on Toyota Hybrid technology. While this cost differential should reduce over time as a result of manufacturing efficiencies, it also likely that supply problems could cause the opposite outcome.
On the other hand, vehicles running on 100% ethanol are technically viable and could be quickly introduced.
Supply of ethanol
Currently most nations using ethanol as a fuel source use it as a mix with gasoline as 15% ethanol and 85% gasoline. This level of supply should be relatively easily sustainable. However, there is concern that, with a higher level of ethanol in the mixture, supply will be an issue.
Producing ethanol from crops such as sugar cane and corn, while relatively competitive, demands too much land to be a complete solution. Less land-intensive approaches are required. A viable method of obtaining ethanol from bamboo has been explored: perhaps this will help. Ethanol from algae has been explored, but it is not yet viable. It is accepted that more research is required to develop a solution that will enable the transition to 100% ethanol.
Sure, there are problems in the land required for 100% ethanol, but alternative methods of production of ethanol are being explored. This problem should not be too hard in a world that has been able to produce three or more vaccines for COVID-19 within twelve months.
The role of Toyota Hybrid technology
The Toyota Hybrid system combines two power sources. When the engine is running, it charges the battery via the generator; when driving conditions allow it, such as in slow-moving traffic, the generator can cut out the petrol engine and let the electric motor take over for zero-emissions travelling. The sophisticated engine management system can sense when the car is stopped and will switch off the engine to conserve power and cut emissions, automatically starting up again when needed.
The primary advantage of this system when using ethanol as a fuel is the reduction in the amount of ethanol used. If a 40% cut in fuel usage was available then the current supply of ethanol of current vehicles were running on E15 could be immediately extended to E25.
In addition, Toyota Hybrid technology significantly reduces the demand for battery materials, since its batteries provide supplementary power, rather being the only power source.
Less resources used to make and power a vehicle is a win-win for the climate and for the earth. One wonders why the Toyota Hybrid technology is not adopted by all car manufacturers. It is a brilliant solution, which could be a real contributor to a difficult global problem: oil-based fossil fuels.
A 2019 IPCC report on land use recommended that people in developed nations should eat less meat. It calculated that the world’s meat intake contributes 8 gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent, which represents 23% of total emissions. Most of these CO2 equivalent emissions are actually from the emission of methane by ruminant animals, like cattle, sheep and goats.
This recommendation is challenged here.
Lies about Methane emissions
The question to be asked, “Did the authors deliberately confuse the issue by using a formula to calculate CO2 equivalent emissions instead of discussing methane emissions, or was it an accident?”
Methane has an atmospheric half-life of around 9.5 years, which represents an average life of 13.5 years.
A rough guide in calculating the increase in the atmospheric level of methane is to compare the current estimated methane emissions with the estimated methane emissions 14 years ago.
Treating this as an appropriate guide to calculate the proportionate increase in the number of animals, this works out to be 7.3 million additional tonnes of methane, or 0.261 gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent. This is only 3% of the 8 gigatonnes cited earlier.
There are three factors here. Firstly, the cited report failed to take into account the fact that the half-life of methane in the atmosphere means that it doesn’t last: it mostly replaces methane already there. Secondly, methane is lost to the atmosphere by being transformed into CO2, but the effect is truly tiny (about 5/1000ths). Thirdly, in calculating the 8 gigatonnes figure, other non-methane factors were taken into account that have nothing to do with methane. Despite this, the 8 gigatonnes is clearly overstated.
Meat is not the most important factor in atmospheric methane
A recent report by Saunis, et al., calculated that the most likely break up of methane emissions in 2011 was as follows:
385 mt from natural sources.
107 mt from ruminants (cattle, sheep, etc.).
30 mt from rice cultivation.
46 mt from fugitive emissions from coal.
88 mt from fugitive emissions from natural gas.
31 mt from biomass (burning dung, etc., for cooking).
However, even this report does not explain all the historical fluctuations in the atmospheric levels of methane. Yet it is not hard to explain them: the most likely explanation is careless, but significant, additional losses of natural gas through gas leaks. The wild fluctuations in methane levels around 1990 had almost nothing to do with additional meat consumption; it was all about gas leaks. In 2011, gas leaks can be estimated to have contributed an additional 137 mt of methane in the atmosphere, with most of those emissions happening prior to 2004. Even now, I estimate that new additional emissions each year of 43 mt can be attributed to gas leaks beyond the numbers in the Saunis report.
Rather than fiddling with social engineering to cut meat consumption, cuts to methane emissions will naturally follow from the planned actions of cutting all coal mining and use, and cutting 90% of natural gas use. This will result in methane atmospheric levels reducing every year from the date that happens. A reducing level of methane in the atmosphere will happen even if red meat consumption increases in line with population.
It is not true that every pound of meat that is eaten results in a permanent increase in methane levels. It not even true that ruminants are adding to CO2 in the long-term, since the CO2 from methane actually comes from eating grass, not from underground. Today’s meat may result in higher methane levels in the atmosphere, but it is “here today” and gone in years to come. It is a part of the normal cycle.
Meat in the methane and CO2 cycle
The meat story as popularly considered and found in scholarly articles is not correct. The impact of meat on methane levels has been grossly exaggerated and the truth should begin to be told. The next UK Climate Change committee report should be revised.
A carbon tariff will be required as a way of encouraging compliance in the event that COP26 arrives at a firm plan to cut real emissions to nearly zero by 2050 or 2060.
COP26 Glasgow
A consensus appears to be emerging that 2050 or 2060 should be set as the date when CO2 emissions should reach nearly zero, sometimes referred to as “net zero”.
Net zero, as a concept, is quite problematic. It envisages continuing to produce enormous amounts of CO2 and then burying it underground in what is described as “secure storage.” In addition, it also contemplates generating a large amount of electricity from biomass (possibly trees and thinnings) and burying this as well.
On the other hand, real zero is an unambiguous concept, but it is not necessary, at least in this century. This is because, even if natural gas and oil-based fuels are only cut by 90%, it is likely that global average temperatures will stabilise at the level when real CO2 emissions are cut to that level and all coal use is ended. Strategies to make cuts of this kind are discussed elsewhere. Some of these strategies are already being implemented: mostly they just need to be ramped up.
A target that could be agreed at COP21 is that all coal use be ended by 2060 and that the use of natural gas and oil-based fuels be cut to 10% of current levels by the same date. This is not the ideal case, which is targeting for 2050, but it may be the practical way forward.
Some nations may be willing to aim for 2050 as the end date instead of 2060, and this is to be encouraged. A 2050 end date could result in a rise in average global temperatures of 1.5C (the “Ideal Model”); an extension out to 2070 end date (only for non-OEDC nations) could result in average global temperatures of 1.7C (the “Split Model”); if emissions continue as at present it could result in average global temperatures of 2.0C (the “Stable Case”).
A carbon tariff is required
If COP26 is to be a success, there must be confidence in each nation that “other nations” will not exploit the system to enable them to gain a competitive advantage by continuing to use cheap, but CO2 intensive, fuels, like coal and natural gas. A carbon tariff could help to provide this level of confidence.
A carbon tariff could be applied to the exports from any nation that fails to meet the targets agreed at COP26. It would not require voluntary action by the defaulting nation, since the tariff will be automatically imposed by the importing nation that would impose the tariff in accordance with a new WTO rule. This rule would be agreed by the Glasgow conference and adding into the WTO rulebook.
When is a carbon tariff triggered
Let us say that the end date for “net zero” or nearly zero (whichever is agreed) is 2060 and the start date is 2020. Then let us assume that CO2 emissions will be reduced by equal increments until 2060. The carbon tariff would be triggered if the International Energy Agency deems that a nation’s CO2 emissions are not tracking down in line with the COP26 agreement.
For most nations, a fair way of calculating the target level for each year would be for the IEA to calculate per capita emissions. The USA’s per capita emissions could be starting point (plus a small contingency). The end point could be agreed at COP26 (such as zero for coal and 10% for natural gas and oil-based fuels). A straight line could be drawn between these two points and that would represent the target level for each year.
For some oil-producing nations this would not be fair (for example Qatar, with a small population and much oil and gas production). In this case, the target line could be drawn between the current level of CO2 emissions (plus an appropriate contingency) and the end point would be the level of emissions agreed at COP26. It also should be understood that emissions from small oil-producing nations actually depend on consumption in other nations.
The quantum of the carbon tariff
A carbon tariff of 20% is quite arbitrary, but it would serve the purpose of providing a very strong incentive to keep to the reductions agreed.
Some nations for whom a per capita target is appropriate are most at risk of breaching the target line in the early years. These are the USA, Australia and Canada. It is expected that each of those nations is already well motivated to cut its CO2 emissions.
Small oil producing nations are also a risk of breaching the target if the target is not set after taking their special situations into account.
All other nations are not likely to be faced with a carbon tariff until many years later. If the EU do not make any cuts it could come in 2040, but it is assumed that the EU will be aiming for 2050 target date and should have no difficulty in staying under the target line. The same should apply to all other nations.
The economic penalty of radically falling exports that would arise from a failure to avoid having a carbon tariff imposed by importing nations could be quite severe. If a carbon tariff is agreed, each nation would be well advised to act prudently in this matter.
Baseload power should be reconsidered in the light of the recent blackouts in Texas. While storage can do much to reduce the frequency of blackouts, storage is limited by the electricity that has been already “stored” in either batteries or via pumped-hydro.
In Texas this week, millions of people were stuck without electricity
The primary role of batteries is to manage the difference between supply and demand for electricity during the day. If the surplus supply is greater than the capacity of the batteries, the surplus can be diverted to pumped-hydro facilities, if available. These can be configured to provide much greater electricity “storage” capacity.
In the event that demand exceeds supply over many successive days, it is possible that both batteries and pumped-hydro dams will be emptied. In this case, blackouts have just been deferred for those initial days and not avoided for the whole period. A baseload power strategy is required to reduce the possibility of a catastrophic failure of electricity supply during an unusual climate event.
How much baseload power is required?
The maximum quantum of baseload power required is the maximum unavoidable demand. This is equal to the maximum demand at any time at day or night less the demand that can be cut off by fiat of the regulator, or by negotiation with business. Things that can be planned to be shut off include:
Aluminium and steel works can be put into standby mode provided sufficient warning is provided.
Domestic and business use of electricity can be scheduled to be shut down in different suburbs and towns at different towns for a short time in order to reduce the peak load.
Certain usages can be banned, depending on the predicted willingness of individual users to comply. For example, cooking the evening meal could be postponed until a later hour or brought forward. In a country like Australia, this would not be welcomed but compliance is likely to be widespread. (For the impact of the 6 pm peak see this analysis done a few years ago for South Australia.)
There will be political price to pay for any requirement to reduce demand for electricity, but there will also be a political price to pay if the cost of more baseload power is more than necessary. It is a matter of balancing costs and risks.
Renewables will still contribute to power in a crisis
It is not possible to guarantee that renewables can supply any level of electricity, but the reasonable probability of renewables being able supply a certain level of power can be calculated. The likelihood of an unusual climate event significantly causing the electrical “storage” system to be exhausted will be reduced wherever there is a wide distribution of renewable energy resources. In Australia, this could encompass all the east coast states plus South Australia. The chance of an unusual climate event having the same impact everywhere is almost zero, but some effect can always be expected.
In calculating the quantum of power that can be sourced from renewables in an extended climate-change crisis one must realistically consider impact of such an event if it happened and consider the probability of such an event, say in the next thirty years. This is a matter for engineers and statisticians to consider.
These calculations will not be easy, but they can be done. Once completed, a reduced maximum quantum of baseload power outside the renewable sector can be calculated.
Gas-fired electricity generators can be used
Even though this conflicts with the idea of “net zero” emissions, there can still be a case for at least 10% of the current use of natural gas to be continued into the future while still holding firm to the target that temperature increase since industrialisation are to be held at 1.5C.
The advantage of continuing to use gas-fired electricity generators for peaking electricity demand is that if an unusual climate event happens that leads to electricity supply being curtailed, the peaking-demand generators can be turned on in off-peak times in order to generate electricity to meet the demand and, if possible, to replenish the electricity “storage”.
The electricity that can be supplied by gas-fired electricity in this crisis will also reduce the calculated maximum quantum of baseload power that is required outside of renewable resources.
Meeting the final baseload power requirement
There are three available methods of providing baseload power:
The downside of burning biomass is the possible negative environment impact of doing this on a large scale.
Geothermal resources, deep underground, provide an excellent means of providing a constant supply of electricity with virtually no environmental impact (even though a project near the Cooper Basin in South Australia was abandoned because it was not economic at the time). Under the scenario considered here, the electricity produced from geothermal sources could be immediately stored and dispatched as required.
Nuclear energy needs to find a new spot in the world’s electricity network. To do this it will be necessary for its advocates to increase the community’s confidence in the long-term safety of nuclear-powered electricity generation. This could be possible via the smaller modular nuclear molten-salt reactors that are currently being considered.
Final baseload power requirement
Using the Australian National Energy Market as a guide, let us try some rough numbers to calculate a safe capacity:
Measures to manage demand reduced anticipated peak demand in a climate-related demand crisis by, say, 25%.
Geothermal contributes, say, 6% to supply by continuous running = 1318 MW (running 24 hours operation 365 days = 11.55 TWh out of 192.4 TWh).
Assume gas-fired peaking capacity (for 1 hour a day) contributes 5% to peak supply to help meet demand = 1,781 MW.
We now move to model total electricity demand per day in a climate-related demand crisis:
Total electricity demand in a year = 192.4 TWh
Daily electricity demand in a day less 25% = 395,000 MWh
Demand that is met by peaking capacity = 1,781 MWh
Additional capacity from peaking = 40,963 MWh
Daily demand met by geothermal = 31,632 MWh
(Normal demand met by wind and solar renewables = 493,000 MWh)
Daily demand met by renewables at 25% (assuming storage has been exhausted) = 123,250 MWh
Net demand to be met by other baseload capacity = 197,394 MWh.
If the other baseload capacity to meet this situation was able to run 24 hours a day, the installed baseload capacity would need to be 10,000 MW (including a 25% contingency). This represents about 30% of peak demand. If a climate-related crisis is expected to result in increased demand, this will need to be taken into account by providing additional baseload power.
Conclusion
On this indicative numbering, electricity from intermittent sources like wind and solar should, on average, be less than 70% of supply. This can be managed by contracting the above pure baseload generators at a fixed price with a guarantee that these generators will meet the available demand before any intermittent supply is taken up. Unless intermittent sources are subjected to this kind of control, baseload power sources will atrophy and close due to lack of use. Therefore, they will not be available when they are needed.
Of course, these numbers are only an indicative example, with other factors to be included as required, but they do show that 100% renewables could bring problems in its wake.
If the first-call use of baseload capacity is not maintained the whole system is likely to become unstable, leading to serious problems in the supply of electricity to those who desperately need it.
It is feasible to remove greenhouse gas emissions in order to cap global warming at around 1.5C. There are simple and well researched ways to do this. Some are under way but they need more work. Ethanol has been overlooked as a serious strategy. It is argued that all of these ways to cut the emissions of greenhouse gases should be done.
Three approaches are considered here and the likely outcomes predicted based on mathematical modelling of the last 170 years and then predicting out to 2070. This requires estimating the likely greenhouse gas levels at the end of each year.
The ideal case, at least as presented here, is a scenario in which it is predicted that it is possible to hold the increase in global average temperature to 1.5C, stabilising at that level. This requires all nations to participate while holding to the timeline indicated below.
While all nations should not find the actions presented here to be an insurmountable challenge, some non-OEDC nations could consider that the timeline for action will be too difficult for them. To cover this situation, a second scenario is canvassed. In this scenario the timeline for implementation for non-OEDC nations starts in 2050 and goes out to 2070. Under this scenario, the predicted outcome is an increase in global average temperature of 1.7C, stabilising at that level.
Finally, we consider a third scenario, which is the continuation of greenhouse gas emissions at the current level out to 2070. The predicted outcome is an increase in global average temperature of 2C and a steady and unrelenting increase in global temperature after that date.
It is noted that these predictions depend upon not encountering a “black-swan” event (being something not already seen in the last 170 years) over the period of the predictions.
Strategies in the “Ideal Model”
Remove coal by 2050
The removal of coal from electricity generation is already happening in OEDC nations. For modelling purposes, it is assumed that this will be completed for all nations by 2050.
Electricity
Removing coal from electricity generation is the most developed strategy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, at least in OECD countries.
Wind and solar are currently the favoured options in most nations. However since they do not always provide dispatchable electricity, methods of storing electricity and then dispatching it to users are required. Presently, the options available to “store” electricity are pumped-hydro, liquid air and batteries. Liquid-air and batteries can provide a useful mechanism to handle the daily fluctuations in supply and demand; pumped-hydro can handle longer-term fluctuations in supply and demand.
Hydro facilities can provide electricity each day as required. Very large facilities can help to manage longer-term fluctuations in supply.
All storage methods share a single limitation: each can only provide dispatchable electricity if it has previously been stored. In the case of unexpected demand beyond the capacity of renewable resources plus storage to meet, either in the short term or more significantly in the medium term, they do not provide a fall-back facility. Nuclear and geothermal energy are the only currently available fossil-fuel free options that can fill the gap (if they too have capacity). Concerns relating to the safety of nuclear energy may possibly be eliminated by using relatively small molten-salt reactors. If fossil-fuel is to be rejected as a source for electricity generation, this matter should be seriously considered.
Other approaches are already being tried, as discussed here.
Remove 90% of oil-based fuels used for all vehicles and ships by 2050
Action on parts of this plan can be commenced immediately. For modelling purposes, it has been assumed that implementation will begin in 2025 and finish in 2050.
Cars
It is physically and economically feasible to replace all petrol and diesel driven vehicles with ethanol driven vehicles by 2050. It is recognised that, with the falling price of oil, there will be a comparative-cost penalty that cannot be allowed to derail the implementation.
Producing ethanol from crops such as sugar cane and corn, while relatively competitive, demands too much land to be a complete solution. Less land-intensive approaches are required. Ethanol from algae has been explored, but it is not yet viable. A viable method of obtaining ethanol from bamboo has been explored. It is accepted that more research is required to develop a solution that will enable the transition to 100% ethanol. (It could be easier to do this than to produce and store hydrogen.)
An ethanol-based vehicle fleet has already been established in Brazil. This nation has implemented technology that will allow petrol vehicles to accept any ethanol mixture, from 100% down to 0%.
To implement an ethanol-based strategy, all new vehicles must be equipped with this technology. Governments could consider a small government subsidy to make this cost-free to users.
Install refuelling bowsers committed to provide a variable ethanol mixture until 100% ethanol supply is sufficiently secure. Variable mixtures to be provided until around 2050.
Ethanol to be produced in countries with surplus agricultural capacity. Growing crops in regions that do not require irrigation must be a priority, for example, growing sugar-cane in tropical and sub-tropic regions, preferably delivered via locally-owned and managed ethanol facilities in the countries in these regions. This approach will provide those countries with a way of relatively pain-free economic development.
The demand for electricity from this approach will require a much larger electricity-generating sector. This will be difficult for countries that are already electricity poor, especially in the absence of relatively cheap coal-fired generators.
The demand for finite resources in order to build fully-electric cars will create supply difficulties, with the world possibly coming close to exhausting such resources. The supply of cobalt is already under stress and alternatives are being developed. The future supply of copper and lithium could also be a limiting factor.
Fully-electric cars at present are much more expensive that plug-in-free hybrids. While this cost differential should reduce over time as a result of manufacturing efficiencies, it also likely that supply problems could cause the opposite outcome.
Remove oil-based fuels for aeroplanes by 2070.
At present, hydrogen for aeroplanes is just an idea, although widely canvassed. For modelling purposes, it is assumed that it will begin in 2050 and be completed by 2070.
It is now recognised that it is unlikely that batteries will be a viable fuel source for long-distance aeroplanes. Currently attention is being given to using a hydrogen-based fuel. This will require three things:
A more cost effective way of producing hydrogen gas is required (possibly from water through electricity).
A cost effective way of compressing hydrogen gas is required.
The proposed aviation fuel is to be proven to be reliable.
It is assumed that this can be done by 2070.
Remove 90% of natural gas from electricity generation by 2050
Natural gas is currently considered the cheapest and most effective way to provide peaking electrical energy. Removing natural gas from the equation will require the implementation of similar strategies to those required for the removal of coal from the electricity-generation process.
Reducing the use of natural gas will have an another benefit: reduced fugitive gas emissions will progressively cut the level of methane in the atmosphere.
This change is unlikely to happen until 2040 and could be completed by 2050.
10% of natural gas has been retained in the model to allow for additional peaking capacity to be retained in the system to cover the times the electricity grid is under unexpected demand stress.
Remove 90% of natural gas from building heating and industry by 2070.
Natural gas provides a versatile fuel for heating. It works in all climates and is relatively non-polluting. The remaining problems are the CO2 generated from burning it and the methane lost during the processes of extraction, transportation and use. The following strategies could be implemented to remove this fuel use:
Increase the volume of methane trapped from organic waste.
If a cost efficient way of producing hydrogen gas from water through electricity is developed, it can be used for heating.
Electrically driven heat pumps can be used for heating provided an appropriate system is chosen and it is shown to be cost effective.
It is assumed that these strategies can begin to be put in place by 2050 and be fully implemented by 2070.
Cut CO2 emissions from the manufacture of cement by 2070.
Methods to be developed so that CO2 from cement manufacture can be eliminated.
Other Actions
These are things that are being done in some places and should be done everywhere straightaway.
If the above strategies to remove greenhouse gas emissions were adopted by all countries, the predicted result is that global average temperatures increases since Industrialisation will be held to 1.5C by 2050 and beyond, with a standard error of ± 0.11 (mostly due to El Niño and La Niña changes in some years and volcanic eruptions).
The modelled values are based on a calculated formula that takes into account the forcing from the additional greenhouse gases in each year and deducts the estimated cooling effect of atmospheric sulphur. More details on the formula can be obtained here.
In this model, no allowance has been made for capture of CO2 and its storage underground. This could be considered, as a last resort, by nations unable to follow this “Ideal Model.”
Split Model
The Split Model covers the situation of the OECD nations following the “Ideal Model,” but the other nations deferring taking these drastic action to remove greenhouse gas emissions until between 2050 and 2070. In this case, the predicted result is that global average temperatures increases since Industrialisation will be be 1.7C, with a standard error of ± 0.11 (mostly from other cyclic climate factors).
Stable Case
The starting point for the Stable Case is the assumption that emissions will continue out to 2070 at the 2018 levels of emissions. It therefore is called the “Stable Case.” (It is assumed that, in the period to 2030, reductions in CO2 emissions after 2018 in OECD nations will be offset by “catch-up” emissions in the other nations.) The stabilising of globalised CO2 emissions was the substantive result of COP21 Paris.
We can expect a temperature increase of around 2C by 2070 if the world follows the Stable Case, with further increases after that date.
Modified IEA-based model
An IEA report, Energy Technology Perspectives, designed to model the actions required to cut greenhouse gas emissions, assumed that significant real CO2 emissions will continue well past 2070. Therefore, carbon capture, utilisation and storage was an important part of its predicted “net zero” outcome. Since most of its predicted actions can be envisaged as taking place towards 2070, it is likely that a stabilised temperature increase of around 2C will be the result of its strategies, around the outcome of the Stable Case for 2070, but with no further temperature increases.
However, using the IEA report framework, it remains possible to consider cutting CO2 emissions substantially by 2050 even without carbon capture and storage.
A “Modified IEA-based model” of this kind would deliver a global temperature increase of 1.6C, being a result somewhere between the other two main models. The downsides of this approach is that it demands virtually immediate action and some very costly infrastructure. It is unlikely that either of these elements will be delivered. On this basis, the “Ideal model” is to be preferred: it offers a better outcome as well as implementation being less costly and less disruptive.
Comparing temperature outcomes
Projections of Global Average Temperatures
Conclusion
While all the actions to remove greenhouse gas emissions described here are important, there are two actions that will make the biggest difference to the final temperature outcomes.
Removing fossil fuels from electricity generation, especially coal, but also natural gas. Both have a very significant impact on the final result and both create CO2 and methane emissions.
The immediate adoption of a strategy to convert all vehicles from fossil fuels to ethanol. This will be simpler, quicker, cheaper and less resource depleting than the currently favoured electric car strategy.
In addition, many small actions to remove greenhouse gas emissions will accumulate to have an appreciable impact on the final result.
