Category: Issues – Climate Change

Net Zero and GHG Emissions

The aim of Net Zero GHG emissions is to stabilise global average temperatures, it is hoped that it can be achieved at 1.5C over pre-industrial levels. The calculation of CO2e for each of the GHG gases needs to take into account the impact of each of these gases upon global average temperatures. For CO2, it is quite simple: just take the quantum of the emissions themselves. 400 parts per million of CO2 equals 400 parts per million tonnes of CO2e. Since N2O has a half life of around 120 years, the normal calculation to convert to CO2e applies. In this case, 300 parts per billion of N2O equals 89 parts per million of CO2e. For the other gases a different calculation must apply. Since the other gases have a half life that significantly impacts their warming potential (methane has a half life of 9.5 years), we cannot just keep adding these warming potentials into our CO2e values. We have to take into account the progressive reduction in the atmospheric levels of these gases from previous emissions. For each year, we can (roughly) add the current emissions into CO2e, but we also have to deduct the losses into the atmosphere from previous years.

Net Zero from methane

For methane, we can simply deduct the losses attributable to the methane emissions in prior years.

  • Year -1: 4.75%
  • Year -2: 13.80%
  • Year -3: 21.99%
  • Year -4: 39.40%
  • Year -5: 36.11%
  • And so on into infinity.

If the world reduces the absolute value of methane emissions in each year, this gives us all a negative CO2e value that can be shared around amongst all nations. This will soften the required reductions in regard to continuing emissions of CO2 and N2O. This negative impact will continue out to 2100 if the reductions in these gases are sufficiently large. It can also go beyond this if the absolute reductions continue. For methane, the most significant element in total emissions consists of the fugitive emissions from coal extraction and natural gas extraction, transportation and use, so it is important to cut these as the first priority.

Emissions of methane are currently around 800 million tonnes. Of this total, about 26% can be attributed to coal and gas fugitive emissions (including the failure to manage leaks properly, especially around the year 1990; some mismanagement is still continuing). If coal use were entirely eliminated, natural gas cut down to only 20% of the current use (for non-energy industrial purposes only), “leaks” of natural gas cut to a “normal level”, and emissions from ruminants and rice production continued in line with population, the emissions of methane each year would be about 670 million tonnes. This reduction of 130 million tonnes of methane per year, would represent a negative CO2e, starting at zero for 2030 and growing to 3,250 million tonnes per year by 2050.

Negative CO2e from refrigerant gases

The warming potential from refrigerant gases is expected to decline from 2025, due to the further implementation of the Montreal Protocol. The atmospheric level of these gases should reduce from this date. These gases have about half the impact of methane, so let us say that it also represents a negative CO2e, starting a zero in 2025 and growing to negative 1,600 million tonnes per year year by 2050.

Positive CO2e from Nitrous Oxide

Based on the increase in atmospheric N2O, we can calculate that N2O emissions are running at about 320 million tonnes per year. It may be possible to cut emissions arising from agriculture so that the final number were 160 million tonnes per year. Based on radiative forcing at current levels of emissions, this would mean that the net CO2e from nitrous oxide would be about 1,200 million tonnes.

Positive CO2e from CO2

Based on the foregoing, for a Net Zero outcome, CO2 emissions from all sources would need to be capped at about 4,000 millions tonnes. This compares with the 35,000 million tonnes of CO2 emissions in 2018. This was made up as follows:

  • Coal 13,000 tonnes (including about 2,000 tonnes of metallurgical coal and coal used for residential heating).
  • Oil based fuels 9,000 tonnes.
  • Natural gas 6,000 tonnes.
  • Cement production 1,500 tonnes.
  • Other (undefined) 5,500 tonnes.

Preferably, all coal uses would have to go if Net Zero were to be achieved. All electricity production using natural gas would have to go. All oil-based fuels need to be replaced by chemical alternatives, like ethanol or ammonia, or by electric vehicles. Alternative ways of building heating will be required, using electric air conditioning and heat pumps with local geothermal resources.

Each of these things will be a challenge, but the biggest is the complete change in electricity generation. Under Net Zero, there is no place for natural gas after 2050. At present, renewables like wind and solar cannot supply anything like baseload power, even with all types of storage, so new baseload resources will be needed, such as geothermal and modular molten-salt nuclear reactors.

Electric cars are a bit of dream, at least for nations that are not rich or have large distances to cover. For the latter, something like the ethanol-driven approach of Brazil seems to be required.

There is considerable hope for “green steel” and “green cement”. We wait in anticipation.

Carbon capture, utilisation and storage

This is a major feature of a recent report by the IEA. The question for me is whether it really will be secure at the volumes being considered. They go far beyond current storage being undertaken in depleted oil and gas wells, with the risk of subsequent leakage currently not being seriously considered.

Net Zero in 2050 vs 2060

The foregoing is predicated on achieving Net Zero by 2050. Whether this is a viable strategy for all nations is debatable. A date like 2060 could be more achievable.

For comparison purposes, I have modelled global average temperatures out to 2070, using two targets. One is that Net Zero, according to my definition, will be achieved in 2050; the other is that Net Zero, on the same basis, is achieved in 2060.

Two scenarios for reaching Net Zero.
Two scenarios for reaching Net Zero

This graph shows that a result close to 1.6C can be achieved, even if (my) Net Zero is not achieved until 2060. Of course, it will be a safer outcome if OECD nations can arrive at that point by 2050.

Conclusion

Net Zero by 2050 may be a pipe dream, but the world could give itself a number more years before we reach a stable 1.5C if urgent action were taken. This is because reduced GHG emissions in the intervening years will reduce the growth in average annual global temperatures. This will involve action on the following issues:

  • Do not build any more coal-fired electricity generators where there are other options available.
  • Do not use gas-fired generators for anything except for the purpose of meeting peak demand.
  • Develop geothermal resources where available, and enter into fixed price contracts for the supply of electricity from such resources 24/7 (to ensure that such facilities are not bankrupted by operations that can only provide intermittent supplies.)
  • Governments to push ahead with funding trials for modular molten-salt nuclear-powered electricity generators.
  • Governments to immediately mandate fuel-flex vehicle electronics, so that ethanol can progressively take over as ethanol production increases and where electric vehicles are not suitable for the particular application, or are too expensive.
  • Governments to mandate that ships entering their ports use non-CO2 fuels.
  • Progressively implement reduced N2O agricultural practices as and when the research indicates that this is possible.
  • Governments to mandate that gas not to be used for building heating in new-builds. When electric air-conditioning is not effective in cold climates, governments to mandate that heat pumps using local geothermal methods be used instead.

AEMO Pricing is making the grid unstable

AEMO pricing, which is designed to achieve the lowest wholesale price for electricity gives no weight to maintaining baseload capacity and gives no consideration to reducing CO2 emissions. These things could be fixed to the addition of a baseload element to the pricing model.

In doing all of these things, the objective to be kept in mind is an end result of global average temperature stabilising at 1.5C over pre-industrial levels.

AEMO pricing model should give priority to baseload generation

Once the medium term baseload demand has been set, those generators that can provide supply that is not dependent on the wind or sun should not be put out of business just because there is a cheaper option. That is current situation. It has already happened with the Pt. Augusta generators where the Chinese-owned operator has demolished the plant so that it can never be used again, even in a crisis.

Unless a change is made in the AEMO pricing model the grid is in danger of all baseload operators being shut down solely to meet the short-term economics of the current model. In this case, the entire grid will be dependent upon the vagaries of the wind and the cloud cover. Even with storage, this will mean that, at times, there will be virtually no electricity supply at all. This should not be allowed to happen.

Wind and solar cannot provide true baseload capacity. This is because it is dependent upon the prevailing climatic conditions, even with storage. The underlying baseload capacity should not come from natural gas: that power source is better suited to meeting demand peaks and is priced accordingly. Hydro and pumped-hydro should also not count, since that depends upon climatic conditions. That is to say, a long drought can knock out hydro and an extended climate event can knock out pumped-hydro.

In a 1.5C world, true baseload capacity can only come from geothermal or nuclear electricity generation. In the current Australian configuration, it can only come from coal-fired generation. These generators can be phased out as “nearly zero” CO2 generators come on board; until that happens they are needed!

Choosing the level of Baseload Capacity

We can start with the smallest level of demand across the grid. Using South Australia experience (which I examined in an earlier piece), average baseload demand was 2/3rds of average daily demand and minimum baseload daily demand was 45% of peak demand.

On this basis, as a rule of thumb, we could say that baseload demand should be set at 45% of average demand, with renewables and natural gas to compete for supplying the rest of the demand. In the event of climate crisis knocking out renewables, storage can be partly replenished on a daily basis by running any natural gas peaking demand on a 24/7 basis. Added to this, government mandated demand management could be used to help the community to power through such an event.

To make all of this work, Australia needs a “baseload protection plan”. We cannot rely upon current AEMO modelling and pricing to deliver on this without some changes to the model.

Coal-fired Baseload electricity

At present, the only option for baseload electricity is coal-fired electricity, even though to meet the 1.5C objective, it must be progressively phased out. Based on published emission intensity data, in NSW, Liddell should not be included in any “baseload protection plan”; in QLD, Gladstone should not be included; and in Yallourn should not be included. These generators are not needed in a “baseload protection plan.” If these three power stations were taken out of operation, if the remaining operations were guaranteed a market share mandated at 60% of capacity, this would generate enough energy to meet baseload capacity requirements.

Under this plan, 60% of the total 24 hour capacity of the “favoured” generators would be sold into the electricity market at an AEMO calculated cost price plus a risk and profit margin, with a total price of around $A60 MWh. (The current AEMO pricing operation would not apply to this “guaranteed market”; AEMO pricing would apply to all other supply that is not included in the “baseload protection plan.”)

Under this plan, as alternative low-emissions supplies come on stream, these coal-fired generators will begin to lose their guaranteed status, one at a time, until none were included.

Geothermal as a Baseload resource

There have been several abortive attempts to get geothermal up in Australia, with the failure of these projects clearly attributed to economic viability, not on technological grounds. They could not survive under AEMO pricing, despite having the ability to provide electricity at a relatively low cost, assuming that were run 24/7.

European economists have calculated that the wholesale cost of enhanced geothermal electricity is likely to be €50 MWh. This is approximately $A80 MWh. With a small margin for risk and profit, an AEMO fixed price could be $A85 MWh. This compares with the current average price of coal-fired generation of around $A60 MWh. It is trivial for most consumers, being $0.025 per kWh on 45% of the supply, with discounts on various tariffs being as high as $0.23 per kWh. Go figure the angst!

Every MWh of electricity that can be produced on 24/7 by the designated baseload suppliers should have priority in supplying to the grid, with its output being sold at a fixed price before any other electricity generators are able to bid for the remaining electricity demand.

Geothermal should be the first option for Baseload supply and should provide Australia with the mechanism to wind-down the use of coal-fired generators. With Australia’s vast land-mass, it likely that they are many opportunities for geothermal electricity, as the following figure shows.

Hot prospects for geothermal-sourced electricity in Australia.
Hot prospects in Australia for geothermal energy

Nuclear as a Baseload resource

The kind of nuclear that may be acceptable in Australia (using a modular molten-salt reactor) is not yet commercially available. When this kind of reactor has been successfully installed elsewhere, it should be considered here, especially if geothermal does not prove to be a satisfactory solution.

Baseload and Storage

Setting up a “baseload protection plan” doesn’t of itself normally require storage, since this supply is planned to be always available, with the quantum being pitched at the lowest level of demand over a weekly cycle. However, there is a good possibility that, when coal-fired electricity has ended and geothermal and nuclear supply have taken over, there will be occasions when supply will be greater than demand at a particular moment in the cycle. To cover these occasions, rather than curtailing production, it would be preferable if the surplus electricity were stored in a large-scale facility, like Snowy 2.0 pumped-hydro. In this situation it could be sold to that facility at a very low price, such as $A5 MWh, thus providing a negative incentive to owners of the baseload power not to provide more baseload power than is required.

It is recognised that storage is needed to handle the daily and weekly cycles of demand. This disconnect between demand and supply is a natural functions of drawing much of the supply from intermittent renewables. Ironically, the 6 pm peak demand arrives at the very time that solar-generation is quite weak, even on a cloud-free day in Australia.

In addition, a case can be made for some level of natural gas peaking demand, for something like one hour a day. Such a facility could be run 24/7 during any climate event that stops renewables producing electricity, which would reduce the severity of such a crisis in terms of electricity production.

In the normal event, storage from liquid air and batteries can probably handle the week-day cycles, with Snowy 2.0 taking up the surplus supply over the weekend.

Conclusion

Our collective objective should be to manage our use of fossil fuels so that global average temperature stabilises at 1.5C over pre-industrial levels.

The changes suggested here can be undertaken almost immediately and will measurably contribute meeting expectations that Australia’s fossil fuel usage can be drastically cut. (Ethanol for oil is the other limb to this strategy.)

However, to successfully navigate a change of this size, it is necessary to change the AEMO pricing structure to protect coal-fired baseload capacity and to ensure that baseload power in the future is not undermined by aggressive pricing and lobbying on behalf of the operators and owners of wind and solar assets.

CO2e is not a robust measure of GHGs

CO2e calculations should not take into account total methane emissions, but only the changes from the levels of 14 years early.

CO2 equivalent (CO2e) attempts to provide a unified measure of Greenhouse Gas emissions (GHGs). Yet it is neither robust nor truthful, primarily because it fails to take into account the 9.5 years half-life of methane.

Calculating CO2e

To convert methane emissions to CO2e emissions, the estimated methane emissions are multiplied by 25.

Since a half-life for methane of 9.5 years converts to an average life of 13.5 years, it would be more robust if CO2e calculations compared the target year’s methane emissions with those 14 years early and then only the difference between those two years was multiplied by 25.

Modelling Global Warming

When attempting to model the impact of the atmospheric levels of greenhouse gas it is actually much better to use the actual levels of each greenhouse gas to calculate the forcing of each of these gases. These individual numbers can then be combined to arrive at a total forcing level.

Another advantage of this method is that it is based on actual observations, rather than estimated levels of emissions, and uses the published levels of forcings for each gas, most of which have been known since 1990 and earlier, modified slightly in 1996. These figures have not been challenged in the scientific literature since then, as far as I can determine.

Here is the results of this kind of modelling. It clearly supports the scientific argument that GHGs have caused the temperature to rise.

Modelling using atmospheric levels of GHGs, rather than CO2e

Problems arising from using CO2e

Since methane is the second most important GHG, it is essential that its impact is fully understood, even by the ordinary public, but especially by journalists and opinion leaders.

If the method of calculating CO2e had real merit for policy-makers, we should be able to use this method in calculating likely atmospheric methane levels. Following this approach, if we add the methane emissions from 1951 to 2020 to the atmospheric methane in 1950, we should get a result close to the actual atmospheric methane in 2020, namely 1870 ppb. Instead we get 24600 ppb, which just demonstrates the logical problem with CO2e. When we see IPCC graphs of CO2e, stretching out to 2100, we don’t have to take these numbers seriously – they are just “indicative,” but of what is not clear.

The frequently raised issue of the projected levels of meat consumption and its climate consequences is a symptom of the unscientific use of CO2e in climate change advocacy and the simple failure to understand or explain the underlying science to journalists and by journalists to the public.

A proper evaluation of the impact of methane on global warming would not see red meat as the first line of attack; instead, the matter that was first addressed would be fugitive emissions from coal and gas extraction, transport and use. Due to human errors and technical problems, these can easily and unexpectedly give rise to higher methane levels. These will take years to work through the system, whereas additional meat consumption will not lead to significant increases in global average temperatures. Cuts in red meat consumption will be difficult to implement and have a minor impact, in comparison with issues like fugitive emissions.

Conclusion

Unless scientists can find a better way to express CO2e, it would be better if journalists and advocates restrained themselves and only referred to CO2, N2O and the F-gases, each of which has its own story. Methane needs a more nuanced analysis than it currently receives.

Toyota Hybrid technology – a 21st century solution

“Toyota Hybrid” technology, with ethanol, is custom made for the 21st century’s move from fossil fuels to renewable energy. Also, it comes without the massive disruption that will be caused by transitioning to fully-electric vehicles.

Toyota Hybrid technology showing the basic components
Toyota Hybrid Synology Drive

Oil-based fuels can be almost completely eliminated via ethanol. Brazil has shown the way to get started by being able to use higher ethanol mixes. The aim should be to get to 100% Ethanol (E100).

Fully-electric vs Ethanol

Almost all the infrastructure is in place to move to ethanol as the primary fuel for all vehicles, whereas fully-electric vehicles will require a virtual doubling of the demand for electricity. In addition, fast electric charging stations would need to be built right across every nation, including nations with large open spaces like Australia, most of Africa, north and south America, and in Asia.

While fully-electric vehicles are increasingly popular in Western countries, it is difficult to see them as a global replacement for petrol and diesel fuelled vehicles:

  • The demand for electricity from this approach will require a much larger electricity-generating sector. This will be difficult for countries that are already electricity poor, especially in the absence of relatively cheap coal-fired generators.
  • The demand for finite resources in order to build fully-electric cars will create supply difficulties, with the world possibly coming close to exhausting such resources. The supply of cobalt is already under stress and alternatives are being developed. The future supply of copper and lithium could also be a limiting factor.
  • Fully-electric cars at present are much more expensive that vehicles running on Toyota Hybrid technology. While this cost differential should reduce over time as a result of manufacturing efficiencies, it also likely that supply problems could cause the opposite outcome.

On the other hand, vehicles running on 100% ethanol are technically viable and could be quickly introduced.

Supply of ethanol

Currently most nations using ethanol as a fuel source use it as a mix with gasoline as 15% ethanol and 85% gasoline. This level of supply should be relatively easily sustainable. However, there is concern that, with a higher level of ethanol in the mixture, supply will be an issue.

Producing ethanol from crops such as sugar cane and corn, while relatively competitive, demands too much land to be a complete solution. Less land-intensive approaches are required. A viable method of obtaining ethanol from bamboo has been explored: perhaps this will help. Ethanol from algae has been explored, but it is not yet viable. It is accepted that more research is required to develop a solution that will enable the transition to 100% ethanol.

Sure, there are problems in the land required for 100% ethanol, but alternative methods of production of ethanol are being explored. This problem should not be too hard in a world that has been able to produce three or more vaccines for COVID-19 within twelve months.

The role of Toyota Hybrid technology

The Toyota Hybrid system combines two power sources. When the engine is running, it charges the battery via the generator; when driving conditions allow it, such as in slow-moving traffic, the generator can cut out the petrol engine and let the electric motor take over for zero-emissions travelling. The sophisticated engine management system can sense when the car is stopped and will switch off the engine to conserve power and cut emissions, automatically starting up again when needed.

The primary advantage of this system when using ethanol as a fuel is the reduction in the amount of ethanol used. If a 40% cut in fuel usage was available then the current supply of ethanol of current vehicles were running on E15 could be immediately extended to E25.

In addition, Toyota Hybrid technology significantly reduces the demand for battery materials, since its batteries provide supplementary power, rather being the only power source.

Less resources used to make and power a vehicle is a win-win for the climate and for the earth. One wonders why the Toyota Hybrid technology is not adopted by all car manufacturers. It is a brilliant solution, which could be a real contributor to a difficult global problem: oil-based fossil fuels.

Implementing a carbon tariff

A carbon tariff will be required as a way of encouraging compliance in the event that COP26 arrives at a firm plan to cut real emissions to nearly zero by 2050 or 2060.

COP26 Glasgow

A consensus appears to be emerging that 2050 or 2060 should be set as the date when CO2 emissions should reach nearly zero, sometimes referred to as “net zero”.

Net zero, as a concept, is quite problematic. It envisages continuing to produce enormous amounts of CO2 and then burying it underground in what is described as “secure storage.” In addition, it also contemplates generating a large amount of electricity from biomass (possibly trees and thinnings) and burying this as well.

On the other hand, real zero is an unambiguous concept, but it is not necessary, at least in this century. This is because, even if natural gas and oil-based fuels are only cut by 90%, it is likely that global average temperatures will stabilise at the level when real CO2 emissions are cut to that level and all coal use is ended. Strategies to make cuts of this kind are discussed elsewhere. Some of these strategies are already being implemented: mostly they just need to be ramped up.

A target that could be agreed at COP21 is that all coal use be ended by 2060 and that the use of natural gas and oil-based fuels be cut to 10% of current levels by the same date. This is not the ideal case, which is targeting for 2050, but it may be the practical way forward.

Some nations may be willing to aim for 2050 as the end date instead of 2060, and this is to be encouraged. A 2050 end date could result in a rise in average global temperatures of 1.5C (the “Ideal Model”); an extension out to 2070 end date (only for non-OEDC nations) could result in average global temperatures of 1.7C (the “Split Model”); if emissions continue as at present it could result in average global temperatures of 2.0C (the “Stable Case”).

Projections of global average temperatures out to 2070 with different strategies.

A carbon tariff is required

If COP26 is to be a success, there must be confidence in each nation that “other nations” will not exploit the system to enable them to gain a competitive advantage by continuing to use cheap, but CO2 intensive, fuels, like coal and natural gas. A carbon tariff could help to provide this level of confidence.

A carbon tariff could be applied to the exports from any nation that fails to meet the targets agreed at COP26. It would not require voluntary action by the defaulting nation, since the tariff will be automatically imposed by the importing nation that would impose the tariff in accordance with a new WTO rule. This rule would be agreed by the Glasgow conference and adding into the WTO rulebook.

When is a carbon tariff triggered

Let us say that the end date for “net zero” or nearly zero (whichever is agreed) is 2060 and the start date is 2020. Then let us assume that CO2 emissions will be reduced by equal increments until 2060. The carbon tariff would be triggered if the International Energy Agency deems that a nation’s CO2 emissions are not tracking down in line with the COP26 agreement.

For most nations, a fair way of calculating the target level for each year would be for the IEA to calculate per capita emissions. The USA’s per capita emissions could be starting point (plus a small contingency). The end point could be agreed at COP26 (such as zero for coal and 10% for natural gas and oil-based fuels). A straight line could be drawn between these two points and that would represent the target level for each year.

For some oil-producing nations this would not be fair (for example Qatar, with a small population and much oil and gas production). In this case, the target line could be drawn between the current level of CO2 emissions (plus an appropriate contingency) and the end point would be the level of emissions agreed at COP26. It also should be understood that emissions from small oil-producing nations actually depend on consumption in other nations.

The quantum of the carbon tariff

A carbon tariff of 20% is quite arbitrary, but it would serve the purpose of providing a very strong incentive to keep to the reductions agreed.

Some nations for whom a per capita target is appropriate are most at risk of breaching the target line in the early years. These are the USA, Australia and Canada. It is expected that each of those nations is already well motivated to cut its CO2 emissions.

Small oil producing nations are also a risk of breaching the target if the target is not set after taking their special situations into account.

All other nations are not likely to be faced with a carbon tariff until many years later. If the EU do not make any cuts it could come in 2040, but it is assumed that the EU will be aiming for 2050 target date and should have no difficulty in staying under the target line. The same should apply to all other nations.

The economic penalty of radically falling exports that would arise from a failure to avoid having a carbon tariff imposed by importing nations could be quite severe. If a carbon tariff is agreed, each nation would be well advised to act prudently in this matter.

Baseload power in a renewable environment

Baseload power should be reconsidered in the light of the recent blackouts in Texas. While storage can do much to reduce the frequency of blackouts, storage is limited by the electricity that has been already “stored” in either batteries or via pumped-hydro.

In Texas this week, millions of people were stuck without electricity. There wasn't enough baseload power.
In Texas this week, millions of people were stuck without electricity

The primary role of batteries is to manage the difference between supply and demand for electricity during the day. If the surplus supply is greater than the capacity of the batteries, the surplus can be diverted to pumped-hydro facilities, if available. These can be configured to provide much greater electricity “storage” capacity.

In the event that demand exceeds supply over many successive days, it is possible that both batteries and pumped-hydro dams will be emptied. In this case, blackouts have just been deferred for those initial days and not avoided for the whole period. A baseload power strategy is required to reduce the possibility of a catastrophic failure of electricity supply during an unusual climate event.

How much baseload power is required?

The maximum quantum of baseload power required is the maximum unavoidable demand. This is equal to the maximum demand at any time at day or night less the demand that can be cut off by fiat of the regulator, or by negotiation with business. Things that can be planned to be shut off include:

  • Aluminium and steel works can be put into standby mode provided sufficient warning is provided.
  • Domestic and business use of electricity can be scheduled to be shut down in different suburbs and towns at different towns for a short time in order to reduce the peak load.
  • Certain usages can be banned, depending on the predicted willingness of individual users to comply. For example, cooking the evening meal could be postponed until a later hour or brought forward. In a country like Australia, this would not be welcomed but compliance is likely to be widespread. (For the impact of the 6 pm peak see this analysis done a few years ago for South Australia.)

There will be political price to pay for any requirement to reduce demand for electricity, but there will also be a political price to pay if the cost of more baseload power is more than necessary. It is a matter of balancing costs and risks.

Renewables will still contribute to power in a crisis

It is not possible to guarantee that renewables can supply any level of electricity, but the reasonable probability of renewables being able supply a certain level of power can be calculated. The likelihood of an unusual climate event significantly causing the electrical “storage” system to be exhausted will be reduced wherever there is a wide distribution of renewable energy resources. In Australia, this could encompass all the east coast states plus South Australia. The chance of an unusual climate event having the same impact everywhere is almost zero, but some effect can always be expected.

In calculating the quantum of power that can be sourced from renewables in an extended climate-change crisis one must realistically consider impact of such an event if it happened and consider the probability of such an event, say in the next thirty years. This is a matter for engineers and statisticians to consider.

These calculations will not be easy, but they can be done. Once completed, a reduced maximum quantum of baseload power outside the renewable sector can be calculated.

Gas-fired electricity generators can be used

Even though this conflicts with the idea of “net zero” emissions, there can still be a case for at least 10% of the current use of natural gas to be continued into the future while still holding firm to the target that temperature increase since industrialisation are to be held at 1.5C.

The advantage of continuing to use gas-fired electricity generators for peaking electricity demand is that if an unusual climate event happens that leads to electricity supply being curtailed, the peaking-demand generators can be turned on in off-peak times in order to generate electricity to meet the demand and, if possible, to replenish the electricity “storage”.

The electricity that can be supplied by gas-fired electricity in this crisis will also reduce the calculated maximum quantum of baseload power that is required outside of renewable resources.

Meeting the final baseload power requirement

There are three available methods of providing baseload power:

  1. Electricity from biomass.
  2. Electricity from geothermal resources.
  3. Electricity from nuclear power.

The downside of burning biomass is the possible negative environment impact of doing this on a large scale.

Geothermal resources, deep underground, provide an excellent means of providing a constant supply of electricity with virtually no environmental impact (even though a project near the Cooper Basin in South Australia was abandoned because it was not economic at the time). Under the scenario considered here, the electricity produced from geothermal sources could be immediately stored and dispatched as required.

Nuclear energy needs to find a new spot in the world’s electricity network. To do this it will be necessary for its advocates to increase the community’s confidence in the long-term safety of nuclear-powered electricity generation. This could be possible via the smaller modular nuclear molten-salt reactors that are currently being considered.

Final baseload power requirement

Using the Australian National Energy Market as a guide, let us try some rough numbers to calculate a safe capacity:

  • Peak demand capacity: 2019-20: 35,626 MW.
  • Measures to manage demand reduced anticipated peak demand in a climate-related demand crisis by, say, 25%.
  • Geothermal contributes, say, 6% to supply by continuous running = 1318 MW (running 24 hours operation 365 days = 11.55 TWh out of 192.4 TWh).
  • Assume gas-fired peaking capacity (for 1 hour a day) contributes 5% to peak supply to help meet demand = 1,781 MW.

We now move to model total electricity demand per day in a climate-related demand crisis:

  • Total electricity demand in a year = 192.4 TWh
  • Daily electricity demand in a day less 25% = 395,000 MWh
  • Demand that is met by peaking capacity = 1,781 MWh
  • Additional capacity from peaking = 40,963 MWh
  • Daily demand met by geothermal = 31,632 MWh
  • (Normal demand met by wind and solar renewables = 493,000 MWh)
  • Daily demand met by renewables at 25% (assuming storage has been exhausted) = 123,250 MWh
  • Net demand to be met by other baseload capacity = 197,394 MWh.

If the other baseload capacity to meet this situation was able to run 24 hours a day, the installed baseload capacity would need to be 10,000 MW (including a 25% contingency). This represents about 30% of peak demand. If a climate-related crisis is expected to result in increased demand, this will need to be taken into account by providing additional baseload power.

Conclusion

On this indicative numbering, electricity from intermittent sources like wind and solar should, on average, be less than 70% of supply. This can be managed by contracting the above pure baseload generators at a fixed price with a guarantee that these generators will meet the available demand before any intermittent supply is taken up. Unless intermittent sources are subjected to this kind of control, baseload power sources will atrophy and close due to lack of use. Therefore, they will not be available when they are needed.

Of course, these numbers are only an indicative example, with other factors to be included as required, but they do show that 100% renewables could bring problems in its wake.

If the first-call use of baseload capacity is not maintained the whole system is likely to become unstable, leading to serious problems in the supply of electricity to those who desperately need it.

Remove Greenhouse Gas Emissions

It is feasible to remove greenhouse gas emissions in order to cap global warming at around 1.5C. There are simple and well researched ways to do this. Some are under way but they need more work. Ethanol has been overlooked as a serious strategy. It is argued that all of these ways to cut the emissions of greenhouse gases should be done.

Three approaches are considered here and the likely outcomes predicted based on mathematical modelling of the last 170 years and then predicting out to 2070. This requires estimating the likely greenhouse gas levels at the end of each year.

The ideal case, at least as presented here, is a scenario in which it is predicted that it is possible to hold the increase in global average temperature to 1.5C, stabilising at that level. This requires all nations to participate while holding to the timeline indicated below.

While all nations should not find the actions presented here to be an insurmountable challenge, some non-OEDC nations could consider that the timeline for action will be too difficult for them. To cover this situation, a second scenario is canvassed. In this scenario the timeline for implementation for non-OEDC nations starts in 2050 and goes out to 2070. Under this scenario, the predicted outcome is an increase in global average temperature of 1.7C, stabilising at that level.

Finally, we consider a third scenario, which is the continuation of greenhouse gas emissions at the current level out to 2070. The predicted outcome is an increase in global average temperature of 2C and a steady and unrelenting increase in global temperature after that date.

It is noted that these predictions depend upon not encountering a “black-swan” event (being something not already seen in the last 170 years) over the period of the predictions.

Strategies in the “Ideal Model”

Remove coal by 2050

The removal of coal from electricity generation is already happening in OEDC nations. For modelling purposes, it is assumed that this will be completed for all nations by 2050.

Electricity

Removing coal from electricity generation is the most developed strategy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, at least in OECD countries.

  • Wind and solar are currently the favoured options in most nations. However since they do not always provide dispatchable electricity, methods of storing electricity and then dispatching it to users are required. Presently, the options available to “store” electricity are pumped-hydro, liquid air and batteries. Liquid-air and batteries can provide a useful mechanism to handle the daily fluctuations in supply and demand; pumped-hydro can handle longer-term fluctuations in supply and demand.
  • Hydro facilities can provide electricity each day as required. Very large facilities can help to manage longer-term fluctuations in supply.
  • Nuclear energy and geothermal energy can provide electricity each day as required.

All storage methods share a single limitation: each can only provide dispatchable electricity if it has previously been stored. In the case of unexpected demand beyond the capacity of renewable resources plus storage to meet, either in the short term or more significantly in the medium term, they do not provide a fall-back facility. Nuclear and geothermal energy are the only currently available fossil-fuel free options that can fill the gap (if they too have capacity). Concerns relating to the safety of nuclear energy may possibly be eliminated by using relatively small molten-salt reactors. If fossil-fuel is to be rejected as a source for electricity generation, this matter should be seriously considered.

Steel

Using hydrogen gas as a substitute for metallurgical coal is being actively explored in several countries. In implementing this, the cost of producing hydrogen gas could be an issue.

Other approaches are already being tried, as discussed here.

Remove 90% of oil-based fuels used for all vehicles and ships by 2050

Action on parts of this plan can be commenced immediately. For modelling purposes, it has been assumed that implementation will begin in 2025 and finish in 2050.

Cars

It is physically and economically feasible to replace all petrol and diesel driven vehicles with ethanol driven vehicles by 2050. It is recognised that, with the falling price of oil, there will be a comparative-cost penalty that cannot be allowed to derail the implementation.

  • Producing ethanol from crops such as sugar cane and corn, while relatively competitive, demands too much land to be a complete solution. Less land-intensive approaches are required. Ethanol from algae has been explored, but it is not yet viable. A viable method of obtaining ethanol from bamboo has been explored. It is accepted that more research is required to develop a solution that will enable the transition to 100% ethanol. (It could be easier to do this than to produce and store hydrogen.)
  • An ethanol-based vehicle fleet has already been established in Brazil. This nation has implemented technology that will allow petrol vehicles to accept any ethanol mixture, from 100% down to 0%.
  • To implement an ethanol-based strategy, all new vehicles must be equipped with this technology. Governments could consider a small government subsidy to make this cost-free to users.
  • Install refuelling bowsers committed to provide a variable ethanol mixture until 100% ethanol supply is sufficiently secure. Variable mixtures to be provided until around 2050.
  • Ethanol to be produced in countries with surplus agricultural capacity. Growing crops in regions that do not require irrigation must be a priority, for example, growing sugar-cane in tropical and sub-tropic regions, preferably delivered via locally-owned and managed ethanol facilities in the countries in these regions. This approach will provide those countries with a way of relatively pain-free economic development.
  • Limit the amount of ethanol required for this change by preferencing plug-in-free ethanol/electric hybrids instead of pure ethanol vehicles.

Trucks

Research in the USA has shown that large trucks can be designed and built to run on ethanol. Change over to this type of engine can be done by 2050. This will require the following steps:

  • Build the engines.
  • Ensure sufficient ethanol supply available to reliably provide all ethanol-driven trucks with fuel.
  • Provide refuelling bowsers that can provide 100% ethanol.

Ships

Research has yet to be done on the best way to convert ships to run on ethanol, but it is assumed that this can done.

Fully-electric vehicles

Fully-electric vehicles are increasingly popular in Western countries. Yet it is difficult to see them as a global replacement for petrol and diesel fuelled vehicles:

  • The demand for electricity from this approach will require a much larger electricity-generating sector. This will be difficult for countries that are already electricity poor, especially in the absence of relatively cheap coal-fired generators.
  • The demand for finite resources in order to build fully-electric cars will create supply difficulties, with the world possibly coming close to exhausting such resources. The supply of cobalt is already under stress and alternatives are being developed. The future supply of copper and lithium could also be a limiting factor.
  • Fully-electric cars at present are much more expensive that plug-in-free hybrids. While this cost differential should reduce over time as a result of manufacturing efficiencies, it also likely that supply problems could cause the opposite outcome.

Remove oil-based fuels for aeroplanes by 2070.

At present, hydrogen for aeroplanes is just an idea, although widely canvassed. For modelling purposes, it is assumed that it will begin in 2050 and be completed by 2070.

It is now recognised that it is unlikely that batteries will be a viable fuel source for long-distance aeroplanes. Currently attention is being given to using a hydrogen-based fuel. This will require three things:

  • A more cost effective way of producing hydrogen gas is required (possibly from water through electricity).
  • A cost effective way of compressing hydrogen gas is required.
  • The proposed aviation fuel is to be proven to be reliable.

It is assumed that this can be done by 2070.

Remove 90% of natural gas from electricity generation by 2050

Natural gas is currently considered the cheapest and most effective way to provide peaking electrical energy. Removing natural gas from the equation will require the implementation of similar strategies to those required for the removal of coal from the electricity-generation process.

Reducing the use of natural gas will have an another benefit: reduced fugitive gas emissions will progressively cut the level of methane in the atmosphere.

This change is unlikely to happen until 2040 and could be completed by 2050.

10% of natural gas has been retained in the model to allow for additional peaking capacity to be retained in the system to cover the times the electricity grid is under unexpected demand stress.

Remove 90% of natural gas from building heating and industry by 2070.

Natural gas provides a versatile fuel for heating. It works in all climates and is relatively non-polluting. The remaining problems are the CO2 generated from burning it and the methane lost during the processes of extraction, transportation and use. The following strategies could be implemented to remove this fuel use:

  • Increase the volume of methane trapped from organic waste.
  • If a cost efficient way of producing hydrogen gas from water through electricity is developed, it can be used for heating.
  • Electrically driven heat pumps can be used for heating provided an appropriate system is chosen and it is shown to be cost effective.

It is assumed that these strategies can begin to be put in place by 2050 and be fully implemented by 2070.

Cut CO2 emissions from the manufacture of cement by 2070.

  • Methods to be developed so that CO2 from cement manufacture can be eliminated.

Other Actions

These are things that are being done in some places and should be done everywhere straightaway.

Ideal Outcome

If the above strategies to remove greenhouse gas emissions were adopted by all countries, the predicted result is that global average temperatures increases since Industrialisation will be held to 1.5C by 2050 and beyond, with a standard error of ± 0.11 (mostly due to El Niño and La Niña changes in some years and volcanic eruptions).

The modelled values are based on a calculated formula that takes into account the forcing from the additional greenhouse gases in each year and deducts the estimated cooling effect of atmospheric sulphur. More details on the formula can be obtained here.

In this model, no allowance has been made for capture of CO2 and its storage underground. This could be considered, as a last resort, by nations unable to follow this “Ideal Model.”

Split Model

The Split Model covers the situation of the OECD nations following the “Ideal Model,” but the other nations deferring taking these drastic action to remove greenhouse gas emissions until between 2050 and 2070. In this case, the predicted result is that global average temperatures increases since Industrialisation will be be 1.7C, with a standard error of ± 0.11 (mostly from other cyclic climate factors).

Stable Case

The starting point for the Stable Case is the assumption that emissions will continue out to 2070 at the 2018 levels of emissions. It therefore is called the “Stable Case.” (It is assumed that, in the period to 2030, reductions in CO2 emissions after 2018 in OECD nations will be offset by “catch-up” emissions in the other nations.) The stabilising of globalised CO2 emissions was the substantive result of COP21 Paris.

We can expect a temperature increase of around 2C by 2070 if the world follows the Stable Case, with further increases after that date.

Modified IEA-based model

An IEA report, Energy Technology Perspectives, designed to model the actions required to cut greenhouse gas emissions, assumed that significant real CO2 emissions will continue well past 2070. Therefore, carbon capture, utilisation and storage was an important part of its predicted “net zero” outcome. Since most of its predicted actions can be envisaged as taking place towards 2070, it is likely that a stabilised temperature increase of around 2C will be the result of its strategies, around the outcome of the Stable Case for 2070, but with no further temperature increases.

However, using the IEA report framework, it remains possible to consider cutting CO2 emissions substantially by 2050 even without carbon capture and storage.

A “Modified IEA-based model” of this kind would deliver a global temperature increase of 1.6C, being a result somewhere between the other two main models. The downsides of this approach is that it demands virtually immediate action and some very costly infrastructure. It is unlikely that either of these elements will be delivered. On this basis, the “Ideal model” is to be preferred: it offers a better outcome as well as implementation being less costly and less disruptive.

Comparing temperature outcomes

Different outcomes using different removal strategies.
Projections of Global Average Temperatures

Conclusion

While all the actions to remove greenhouse gas emissions described here are important, there are two actions that will make the biggest difference to the final temperature outcomes.

  1. Removing fossil fuels from electricity generation, especially coal, but also natural gas. Both have a very significant impact on the final result and both create CO2 and methane emissions.
  2. The immediate adoption of a strategy to convert all vehicles from fossil fuels to ethanol. This will be simpler, quicker, cheaper and less resource depleting than the currently favoured electric car strategy.

In addition, many small actions to remove greenhouse gas emissions will accumulate to have an appreciable impact on the final result.

Scott Morrison wins Australian Federal Election

Scott Morrison has overcome the attempt to re-introduce class warfare into the Australian electoral system with a “steady as she goes” campaign strategy.

Labor’s Campaign

In a carefully calculated attempt to re-invigorate union control of the Australia economy, the ALP set out a programme to target all Australians who were not unionists. This programme included the following “difficult to explain” elements:

  1. Eliminating Franking Credits for retirees in self-managed superannuation funds, but keeping them for retirees who are in externally managed Superannuation funds, which are mainly union-managed funds.
  2. Supporting the proposition that there should be an increase to the minimum wage without regard to the possible negative impact on jobs.
  3. Allowing lawless union activity and removing the “industrial umpire” in the construction industry.
  4. Radical action on climate change beyond that agreed at COP21 and beyond that committed to by other comparable nations, with little real consideration of the employment consequences of this approach. Given its rhetoric, and reliance on Greens preferences, the ALP were unable to articulate a policy fix to work around this. This did not trouble voters in Melbourne or Canberra, since they did not perceive a risk to their own jobs, but it did worry voters in Queensland.

Maximising Scott Morrison’s win

Continuing failure of the Liberals to win over Canberra’s voters (and the opinion-makers at the ABC and SBS) will be a cancer on future Liberal policy making. In addition, the time is approaching when the ALP will not be able to govern in its own right, but in a future time its only hope will be to govern in coalition with the Greens. Already, the ALP cannot win many seats without Green preferences.

For the Liberals, it will not be enough to point out the overt socialism of Green leaders or the economic dead-end of Labor’s class war. Furthermore, the Greens are already starting to show more pragmatism than the ALP on policies like the Franking Credits changes, with plans to protect less wealthy investors. The challenge for the Liberals will be to come up with their own version of “reasonable and easily defensible policies.” Here are some suggestions for immediate action:

  1. Fix the “wages drought” by arguing for a $1 hour increase in the minimum wage in this year’s Fair Work hearing.
  2. Make Mabo Day a Federal public holiday.
  3. Explain that Australia is cutting its CO2 emissions in accordance with its commitments to COP21.
  4. Explain that the Coalition has a policy to provide dispatchable electricity via Snowy 2.0.
  5. Protect jobs in vulnerable sectors, such as horticulture, via modest tariffs.

Wages Drought

The government and the Reserve Bank have already agreed that inflation should be between 2% and 3%, yet it is currently running below that level. We know that inappropriate across-the-board increases in wages are the main cause of runaway inflation. Surely the corollary of that is that inappropriate wage-freezes are the cause of inflation running at too low a level. Therefore, it follows that a significant minimum wage increase at this time is appropriate. Don’t drop the ball on this, Scott Morrison. If you do, you will be opening up the field to the ALP to foster discontent.

Most of Australia’s export industries will not be hurt at all by this change, as they operate at the other end of the wages spectrum, with mining, medical research and IT sectors paying well above the minimum wage to most of their employees. The tourism sector could suffer some short-term impacts, but it is a highly vulnerable sector in any case with many other factors playing a more important part than the wages paid to minimum wage employees.

The import-competing sectors could suffer some pain, but the government has the means to address this issue by another mechanism, discussed below.

A change in the minimum wage will be much more effective in restoring balance to the Australian economy than can be achieved by cutting interest rates since that is likely to have other and unmanageable consequences.

Mabo Day

Most Australians recognize the importance of Australia Day. It recognizes the beginning of European settlement in this nation; most Australians are Europeans. On the other hand, Mabo Day could be an equally important day in Australia’s calendar. It would be a day to remember when the original inhabitants of this land began to get legal title to the land upon which they are still living. It can be a day when Aborigines, Torres Strait Islands and the European and other immigrant peoples remember and celebrate the original inhabitants of this land. Scott Morrison, don’t you think it deserves to be recognized?

COP21

In Paris, Australia made a voluntary commitment to cut greenhouse Gases by 26% to 28% by 2025 from 2005 levels.

Since Australia only emits 1.3% of the world’s greenhouse gases, it is not possible for Australia’s action to have any measurable impact on global warming. Therefore, it is appropriate for Australia to be a follower, not a leader in this matter, especially since its commitments to COP21 follow that requirement. Certainly we can do more, provided it can be done without seriously damaging our own economy and without destroying the jobs and incomes of ordinary Australians. This is the lesson of the recent election, which was claimed to be a “referendum” on this subject. The nation’s action on climate change should bring the nation together, not divide it, as the ALP and the Greens wanted to do. On this point, Scott Morrison was clearly correct.

While many in the electorate like the idea of Australia leading the world on climate change action, and probably most of the voters in Canberra (which includes the civil servants advising the government and the nationally-funded broadcasters, the ABC and SBS), it will have a cost in terms of jobs, a point which voters in Queensland clearly perceived.

In addition, Australia should not be party to the worldwide green conspiracy to deprive India and other emerging nations of access to cheap electricity via Australia’s coal. When the West and China emit less CO2 than India it may have a moral right to dictate how India should proceed in this matter. Whether it should do so, even at this point, is a matter of geopolitics as well as moral arguments.

Snowy 2.0

Only the Coalition has a workable policy to turn generated electricity into dispatchable power. This important contribution to this subject was made by the former PM, Malcolm Turnbull, being a policy that Scott Morrison has retained. Of course, Snowy 2.0 is only a start, but this “solution” is likely to be repeated, with the Kidson power project in North Queensland also being indirectly supported by the Queensland Labor government.

On this question, Labor and the Greens have been very quiet, hoping not to give any credit for real action on climate change to the Coalition. Scott Morrison and the Coalition should not allow this policy vacuum in their opponents’ rhetoric to continue to go unchallenged.

Tariffs

All major parties have a blind spot on tariffs, believing for some reason or other that minimum wage Australians can compete with people overseas on half, quarter and even one-tenth of Australian wages and conditions without any problems.

This is a manifestation of the arrogance of the Canberra bubble and I seriously hope that Scott Morrison can burst this bubble.

Critiquing Some Labor Policies

Franking Credits

The system of Franking Credits is an innovative approach to avoid double taxation for Australian investors. It was introduced by a previous ALP government. It had the significant benefit that overseas investors in companies of all kinds were no longer better treated than local investors (since overseas investors are only taxed at a notional rate on dividends and interest earnings). The outcome of the ALP’s tinkering could have been the beginning of the end of this scheme in its entirety, a result in which Labor’s class-war warriors would have rejoiced, urged on by the Liberals’ hard-right “free trade” faction. A plague on both their houses!

Negative Gearing

The system of negative gearing for housing investments has been a thorn in the side for taxation system designers of all political persuasions. A previous ALP government tried removing it, but had to unwind the change because it immediately caused property rents to increase. Undeterred, ALP’s Bowen planned to try to do this again. The problem with this plan is that rents provide a very poor return on residential property returns, with the shortfall made up by immediate tax deductions for the loss on property investments and the hope of future capital gains. Ignoring the likely adverse outcomes of a policy platform is not recommended.

Capital Gains Tax changes

There is a fairness aspect to the Capital Gains Tax discount and there is an economic incentive aspect. The fairness aspect relates to the “lumpy” nature of capital gains since, for individuals selling a business and receiving a capital gain, this could be a once-in-lifetime event. In this case, taxing at the full marginal rate of tax applicable in that year would be unfair. Even though averaging could be introduced at this point, there is a more important element that should be included when considering capital gains taxes. This relates to the nation’s need for capital investment and capital accumulation in order to maintain the nation’s prosperity into the future. Encouraging investment via the capital gains discount should help to build up the nation’s capital; even negative gearing also serves this purpose. At present, Australia has a problem with insufficient capital investment. The need for more investment is a matter that does not appear to have been considered by the ALP when proposing to reduce the capital gains discount and their changes to negative gearing. While their proposals had a ready audience among those who do not invest for the future, the ALP has no excuse for not putting national interest ahead of a “cheap win” in these matters.

Conclusion

Scott Morrison is to be congratulated for running an effective campaign, highlighting some of the inadequacies in the “bold agenda” put forward by Labor. It is now up to the Prime Minister to lead a government that really does work for all the people, not just for those who voted for the Coalition.

COP24 Katowice – CO2 Emissions

CO2 Emission targets for COP24 naturally follow on from COP21, which for real contributors was a cut of about 1% of total CO2 emissions – 356,000 tonnes of CO2 per year – until around 2025.

Given the range of global disparity in CO2 emissions, a cut of about 356,000 tonnes of CO2 per year is probably as much as can be realistically achieved in this period, at least until new ways of cutting CO2 emissions are fully implemented or even new ones invented. This could then be a CO2 emission reduction target for COP24, out to 2025.

Energy-Related Emissions – Actuals

When the actual figures for total CO2 emissions come out we will know the truth about 2017, but at present we can say that energy-related emissions grew by 1.4% in 2017. However, it is noteworthy that emissions have not followed the growth in GDP.

CO2 Emissions vs GDP

While the USA continued the downwards march of its CO2 emissions, most of the increases in 2017 can be attributed to China (up 1.7%), European Union (up 1.5%) and the Developing Asia (up 3.1%). Developing Asia (i.e. excluding China) can be excused for its increase in CO2, since this region is well below the world average CO2 emissions per person.

COP24 – China’s emissions

Even though China’s emissions are below those of most western nations, they are well above the global average CO2 emissions. If CO2 cuts are to be achieved China cannot just stand on the sidelines and point the figure at other nations.

China cannot even say, “India’s emissions are also increasing.” The fact is that India needs to catch up on its electrification, and there is plenty of scope for it to do so. Global average emissions are around 5.0 tonnes per person per year. India’s emissions are running at less than 2.0 tonnes per year.

In regard to 2017, seasonal factors could have played a role if some emissions had “moved” from December 2016 to January 2017, (as movements in atmospheric CO2 readings seem to indicate). But the real question to be answered by China is, “What will be energy-related emissions in 2018?”

COP24 – Europe.

Europe’s failure to cut emissions in 2017 is very disappointing, particularly given the EU’s criticism of other nations (particularly USA) when the USA is actually cutting emissions.

Factors contributing to the EU’s setback include Germany’s partial loss of faith in nuclear and the dysfunctional EU ETS scheme. The question for the EU is, “What are you doing to remedy your failures?”

COP24 – Immediate CO2 Emissions target

COP21 Paris required nations to set their own targets for CO2 emission reductions. Leaving to one side China’s effective non-participation in any realistic way in the “commitment” process, it was an effective way to proceed, since non-binding commitments are likely to be more ambitious than binding commitments.

There does not appear to be any basis to change the COP21 overall target, since cuts of this magnitude will contribute significantly to the goal of decarbonising the world’s economy.

There are even ground to believe that unanticipated cuts have already been delivered. Two possibilities stand out:

  1. China’s well-publicized cuts in coal consumption and the move to use higher quality coal should have cut China’s emissions  – but did this happen?
  2. A cut in India’s inefficient use of fuel for cooking and other purposes due to an increase in electrification of that nation should have given rise to a cut in net emissions – has this been factored into the IEA numbers?

COP24 – Future CO2 Emission target

Even higher rates of CO2 emission reductions are possible in the medium term. At present, the most fruitful lines of future development, not fully factored into the current targets, are:

  1. Increasing penetration of pumped-hydro as a way of dealing with the problem of unpredictable supply of electricity from wind-farms, without bringing in its train the “CO2 cost” of using peak electricity gas-powered generators.
  2. Increasing the community’s confidence in the long-term safety of nuclear-powered electricity generation, possibly via new technology currently under evaluation, leading to a higher level of take-up of nuclear energy.
  3. Eventual replacement of all petrol and diesel-powered passenger vehicles with electric vehicles.

If these all came to fruition, along with others not yet considered, a doubling of the annual expected CO2 emission reductions to one million tonnes of CO2 per year is not beyond practical delivery. This could be target set at COP24 for after 2025.

COP24 Katowice – Real Issue

COP24 Katowice is danger of being strangled by non-central issues. The real issue for this international conference on climate change is understanding CO2 and the reduction in emissions required for effective action.

COP23 – Attempted Sidetrack

An attempt was made to sidetrack COP23 (2017) by asserting that CO2 emissions would increase in that year by 2%, with the strong implication that the stall in CO2 emissions since 2014 had come to an end. Yet it does not appear that the “stall in emissions” has really come to an end. Instead, cuts in emissions are continuing around the world. Despite disappointing results in a few places, there does not appear to be a good reason to abandon the hope that the commitments made at COP21 will eventually result in significant and continuous cuts in CO2 emissions.

GDP vs CO2 Emissions
Demonstrating the “Stall”

COP24 – Potential Side Issues

When we are discussing climate change as a result of global warming, the real issue must always be CO2 emissions. Unless CO2 emissions are eventually cut to around a net zero level, global average temperatures will continue to rise and the disruptions that are currently occurring in a number of regions throughout the world will continue to happen.

Some are worried that a significant rise in ocean levels is inevitable, since the upwards march of atmospheric CO2 is inexorable. While a number of islands and low-lying regions have reason to fear a significant rise in ocean levels, it is currently quite unlikely that the doomsday scenarios being put forward in scholarly journals have any basis in a realistic forecast of future CO2 levels. The reason for this is that CO2 emissions have now stalled and should be forecast to be cut, not to continuously increase.

However, the looming side-issue for COP24 is the subject of the fund agreed at COP21 to provide money to mitigate the effect of climate change. The decision to set up this fund was a mistake and it has already been shown to be ineffective and misconceived.

No matter how much money is provided to this “mitigation fund” and no matter how well the money is spent, it will not stop global warming or the climate change effects. The main aim of COP24 should be capping global warming by reducing CO2 emissions. A desirable end target is to cap atmospheric CO2 at 450 ppm. It is currently around 410 ppm. This should be the real issue at COP24.

Energy-Related Emissions – Actuals

When the actual figures for total CO2 emissions come out we will know the truth about 2017, but it is true that energy-related emissions did grow by 1.4% in 2017.

While the USA continued the downwards march of its CO2 emissions, most of the increases in 2017 can be attributed to China (up 1.7%), European Union (up 1.5%) and the Developing Asia (up 3.1%). Developing Asia (i.e. excluding China) can be excused for its increase in CO2, since this region is well below the world average CO2 emissions per person. On the other hand, China and the European Union have a case to answer for their increases in CO2 emissions in 2017. In China’s case, seasonal factors could have played a role if some emissions “moved” from December 2016 to January 2017, (as movements in atmospheric CO2 readings seem to indicate). Germany’s partial loss of faith in nuclear and the dysfunctional EU ETS scheme could also have played a role. Since Europe has claimed for many years a leading role in the climate change debate, this more recent increase in CO2 emissions in the EU is very disappointing.

COP24 – Immediate CO2 Emissions target

COP21 Paris required nations to set their own targets for CO2 emission reductions. Leaving to one side China’s effective non-participation in any realistic way in the “commitment” process, it was an effective way to proceed, since non-binding commitments are likely to be more ambitious than binding commitments.

One can summarize the proposal cuts as representing a goal of an overall cut of about 1% of the level of 2015 emissions from 2016 onwards. If this were achieved, it would mean a cut of 356,000 tonnes of CO2 per year until around 2025.

Given the range of global disparity in CO2 emissions, a cut of about 356,000 tonnes of CO2 per year is probably as much as can be realistically achieved in this period, at least until new ways of cutting CO2 emissions are fully implemented or even new ones invented. This could then be a CO2 emission reduction target for COP24, out to 2025.

Using this number as a base, one could expect atmospheric levels of CO2 (at Mauna Loa) to increase by 2.35 ppm per year in 2018 (standard deviation 0.41 ppm), yet for each month since June 2018 they have been increasing at a (rolling) annual rate of around 2.0 ppm per year. While there is reasonable skepticism about the usefulness of this statistic in a short-term context  (see the article “Real-time verification of CO2 emissions”), at least it is on the side of a reduction, not on the side of an increase.

Given that increases in atmospheric CO2 from previous years’ ocean warming (measured by the Oceanic Nino Index) should now have worked their way through the system, we can be hopeful that some significant, previously ignored, potential cuts in emissions have occurred. Some possibilities stand out: 1) China well-publicized cuts in coal consumption and the move to use higher quality coal; 2) A cut in India’s inefficient use of fuel for cooking and other purposes due to an increase in electrification of that nation.

COP24 – Future CO2 Emission target

Even higher rates of CO2 emission reductions are possible in the medium term. At present, the most fruitful lines of future development, not fully factored into the current targets, are:

  1. Increasing penetration of pumped-hydro as a way of dealing with the problem of unpredictable supply of electricity from wind-farms, without bringing in its train the “CO2 cost” of using peak electricity gas-powered generators.
  2. Increasing the community’s confidence in the long-term safety of nuclear-powered electricity generation, possibly by new technology currently under evaluation, leading to a higher level of take-up of nuclear energy.
  3. Eventual replacement of all petrol and diesel-powered passenger vehicles with electric vehicles.

If these all came to fruition, along with others not yet considered, a doubling of the annual expected CO2 emission reductions to one million tonnes of CO2 per year is not beyond practical delivery. This could be target set at COP24 for after 2025.